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MARINE OIL SPILLS: A PROBLEM
IN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
PAUL G, BRADLEY*

Pollution of the seas by oil has recently become a matter of widespread concern, attracting the attention of politicians, environmentalists, physical and social scientists, lawyers and persons of
other diverse specializations. No doubt much of this increased interest is attributable to several spectacular accidents, in particular, the
unfortunate consequences of drilling in the Santa Barbara Channel
and the wreck of the Torrey Canyon off the coast of England.
Although one or the other of these disasters is mentioned within the
first few paragraphs of a majority of recent articles about marine oil
pollution, such well-publicized events probably account for only a
small fraction of the total amount of oil that enters the oceans each
year. An estimate for 1969 of this total quantity with a breakdown
by sources is given in Table 1.
TABLE I
ESTIMATES OF DIRECT OIL LOSSES INTO THE WORLD'S WATERS, 1969t
(Metric tons per year)
Percentage of
Loss
Tankers (normal operations)
Controlled
Uncontrolled
Other ships (bilges, etc.)
Offshore production
(normal operations)
Accidental spills
Ships
Nonships
Refineries
In rivers carrying industrial
automobile wastes
TOTAL

Total Loss

30,000
500,000
500,000

1.4
24.0
24.0

100,000

4.8

100,000
100,000
300,000

4.8
4.8
14.4

450,000
2,080,000

21.6
100.0

tSource: Study of Critical Environmental Problems, Man's Impact on the Global Environment (1970). Notes on statistical sources and estimating procedures are provided in the
cited volume.
*Associate Professor, Department of Economics, University of British Columbia. An earlier
version of this paper was presented to the Southwest Social Science Association, in San
Antonio, Texas, on March 31, 1972.
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In this paper I will be primarily concerned with spillage occurring
in connection with ocean transport of petroleum and offshore production, sources which together account for approximately 35
percent of the total quantity of oil finding its way into the oceans,
according to the figures in Table 1. This is a sizable share, and it is
increased to about 60 percent by including oil discharged into the
oceans by other types of ships. Furthermore, the absolute volume of
crude oil and products shipped by sea has been continuously increasing, as has the volume of offshore production. It is important to
remember, however, that there are other significant sources of oil
pollution besides those for which control methods will be examined
here.
Petroleum is, of course, only one of a number of pollutants which
have "an impact on the global environment." ' For some of these
materials-DDT, for example-banning use may be the best corrective
measure. This is feasible where substitutes can be introduced without
serious economic disruption, substitutes which themselves do not
create serious environmental problems. For other substances,
banning use is not feasible; for these, institutions must be developed
so that use can be continued, while at the same time damage can be
kept to an acceptable level. Petroleum belongs in this latter category.
In this analysis oil spillage is a chance event determined jointly by
the probability of accident and the probable quantity of oil released
as a result. I argue the necessity of establishing a target performance
standard to govern activities where pollution of the oceans is a
threat; performance is measured by quantity of oil discharged. Once
such a target is determined, its achievement becomes the responsibility of an enforcement agency. This agency must have tools which are
capable of securing compliance, while at the same time giving the
industries involved both incentive and scope to search for solutions
to the pollution problem. The agency must be judged by its success
in meeting the target standard and also by the cost of the necessary
enforcement measures. Key questions, therefore, in the management
of marine oil pollution relate to the method of establishing performance standards and to the selection and use of instruments for
achieving compliance.
The paper is divided into three major sections. In the first I discuss
the economics of the oil pollution problem, first identifying the
range of opportunities open to the industry for reducing spillage and
then considering the incentives for undertaking such measures, both
1. The phrase is drawn from the title of an important study: Study of Critical Environmental Problems, Man's Impact on the Global Environment (1970).
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in the presence and in the absence of a central authority. In the
second section I examine several proposals that have been advanced
for controlling the oil spill problem. These proposals would extend
various laws or conventions which are now used to a limited extent; I
argue, however, that they are deficient for fundamental reasons. In
the concluding section I compare marine oil spills with other pollution problems and outline some considerations which are important
in the design of institutions by which environmental quality can be
maintained.
ECONOMICS OF THE SPILL PROBLEM

To analyze the adjustments that can be made in order to remedy
the oil spill problem I will consider an economic model. One purpose
of the model will be to indicate the nature of the solution, in particular, that it is most unlikely to entail the elimination of spills,
however appealing that would be. Writers who begin with the
premise that "in the interests of mankind, the pollution of the seas
cannot be allowed" ' apparently do not intend that their words be
taken literally; if they did, the ensuing discussion would be brief,
consisting of an appeal to halt ocean transport of crude oil and to
leave the resources of the continental shelves untapped. As the
figures in Table 1 show, however, even this drastic action would not
halve all significant sources of marine oil pollution.
Economic models typically describe situations in which choices
must be made; we approach the oil spill problem within this frame of
reference. With regard to transport of oil, decisions must be made
about which routes and what equipment will be used, and what
schedules will be established. The variety of technical measures for
preventing spills and limiting losses, if a spill situation occurs, is
illustrated by the list in Table 2. This outline was submitted by the
United States delegation to the Subcommittee on Ship Design and
Equipment of the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of the InterGovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) at its first
session?
Two categories of transportation accident are recognized:
(1) "collision or stranding" and
(2) "spill during transfer operations" (release during loading,

carrying, and discharging).
Within each category, the methods are divided between those that
2. Dunn & Hargrave, Oil Pollution Problems on the Pacific Coast, 6 U.B.C.L. Rev. 137,

163 (1971).
3. The Subcommittee was established in January, 1967. Complexity of committee structure, of which this is a modest example, is a conspicuous feature of maritime policy-making.
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TABLE 2
MEANS OF REDUCING OIL SPILLAGE*
I. TYPE OF ACCIDENT: COLLISION OR STRANDING
A. Means of preventing the accident
1. Avoiding Danger Situations
(a) Training
Rules of the Road
(b) Equipment to detect situation
(c) Rules of the Road
(d) Navigation lights and signals
(e) Sea lanes, traffic separation
(f) Charts, piloting information
(g) ... 32,4.
2. Evading Danger Situations
(a) Training
(b) Ship response
1. maneuverability
2. stopping; backing power
3. prime mover, multiple units, multiple screws
4. controllable-pitch propellers
S. anchors; remote release, stern anchor
6. speed reduction equipment: bow flaps, split rudders
7 . ..
B. Limiting loss of cargo when accident has occurred

1. Tank Size and/or Arrangement of Voids
2. Collision Barriers
3. Isolation of Tank and Piping from Side or Bottom Damage
4. Piping Arrangements; Rapid Transfer
5. Increased Strength of Hull
6. Reducing Size of Tanker
7. ...
II. TYPE OF ACCIDENT: SPILL DURING TRANSFER OPERATIONS
A. Means of preventing the accident
1. Training
2. Simplified Operations; Centralized Control
3. Reliable Instrumentation
4. Established Loading and Discharge Procedures
5. Design Criteria
6. Tank and Piping Construction Standards
7 . ..
B. Limiting loss of cargo when accident has occurred
1. Tank Size
2. Isolation of Tank and Piping From Side and Bottom Damage
3. Tank and Piping Arrangements
4 . ..
*Source: Price, Anti-Pollution Measures-IMCO Subcommittee on

Ship Design and

Equipment, Marine Technology, Jan., 1971, 1-5 (Quoted with minor alterations).

reduce the chance of the accident occuring and those that limit the
loss of oil once an accident has taken place. This listing covers technological specifications for vessel construction and navigation, but as
previously remarked, the probability of accident on a particular
route could also be reduced by securing flexibility in scheduling. For
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example, by putting in extra storage capacity, interruptions in tanker
schedules could be tolerated, and this would permit operations to be
curtailed during periods of increased risk because- of bad weather.
Figures 1 and 2 describe the economics of adopting different
FIGURE 1
Cost of Reducing Probability of Accident
(+)

Total cost,
C(P;S)

(- 1.0)
Probability of
accident, P

Incremental
cost, Cp

means for reducing oil spillage. Figure 1 shows the total and incremental costs of reducing the probability of accident, and Figure 2
shows the costs of decreasing the size of a spill given that an accident
has occurred. Specifically, the upper panel of Figure 1 indicates the
increasing cost required to diminish the probability of accident from
an initial reference level, Po, to some lower level. The lower panel
shows the corresponding incremental cost. The shape of the curves is
postulated on the assumption that to reduce the probability of accident the cheapest measures would be utilized first. It becomes more
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FIGURE 2
Cost of Reducing Mean Spill Size

Total cost,
C(S;P)

Expected spill
size, S

Incremental
cost, Cs

costly to achieve further incremental reductions as lower probabilities of accident are achieved. Figure 2 is very similar. It indicates
that as measures are implemented to reduce the amount of oil lost in
the event of an accident, increasing incremental costs will be observed as the allowable spill size becomes smaller, measured from an
initial reference size, So .
If spill-preventing investment yields results of the form depicted in
Figures 1 and 2, and if the cost to society of damage increases with
greater quantities of oil spilled, 4 one can anticipate that there will be
a socially optimal level of such investment. The relevant investment
decisions are made by particular private firms, however, while the
4. I return in later sections to the question of whether the cost of damage can, in fact, be
measured and compared with the cost of prevention. For the present I assume the concept
of a damage function in which damage increases with higher rates of spillage.
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damage caused by spills is usually borne in large part by others. This
is a familiar situation in the economics of environmental quality, and
the familiar prescription is the imposition of a pollution tax.' This
device serves to internalize the damage cost, that is, to guarantee that
prospective damage costs are treated by the decision-maker as a relevant part of the problem.
While the problem of marine oil pollution has a strong resemblance to other water pollution problems, there are some important
differences. Oil spillage is intermittent and unpredictable as to time
and place. Though these elements may be present in other water
pollution situations, they can often be suppressed or ignored, whereas here they are central to the analysis. For any particular ship
voyage, accident occurrence is probabilistic. The situation is similar
for the drilling of an offshore well. Furthermore, although shipwrecks or well blowouts are conspicuous, oil spillage both from ships
and from offshore drilling operations often occurs under less spectacular circumstances and may not be observed except by the operator
responsible. Detection therefore becomes an important function of
an agency charged with enforcing sanctions, and this element of the
problem should be considered. 6
The notation required for my economic model is listed in Table 3.
For a particular event, say a voyage between specified points or a
month's operating time of an offshore rig, we define the probability
P of the occurrence of an oil spill of expected size S. This type of
risk is felt both by society and by particular firms, and it can be
reduced by precautionary investment. In addition, the polluter faces
another kind of risk: that he will be detected and subjected to a
penalty. Given that a spill has occurred I denote the probability of
detection ir. This risk reflects the effectiveness of the enforcement
agency.
Following Figure 1 I postulate that the incremental cost of
reducing the probability of occurrence of a spill increases at lower
probability levels: Cp< 0 and Cpp> 0. Similarly, following Figure 2,
I postulate that the incremental cost of reducing the mean size of a
spill (given that one has occurred) increases at lower spill sizes: Cs<
0 and CSs> 0. Initially we assume that pollution damage, D(S), for
5. Such taxes are associated with the work of A. Pigou; a more recent discussion can be
found in A. Kneese, The Economics of Regional Water Quality Management (1964).
6. The economics of optimal law enforcement has recently received the attention of G.
Becker and G. Stigler. Becker, 0rime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol.
Econ. 169 (1968); Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Law, 78 J. Pol. Econ. 526 (1970).
The oil spill problem is an interesting area for application of some of the ideas suggested by
these authors.
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TABLE 3
DEFINITIONS OF SYMBOLS

SYMBOL
P

DEFINITION
Probability of accident during voyage (or per
month of offshore drilling)

S

Expected size of spill, given that an accident
has occurred

C(PS)

Investment in preventing spills or reducing spill
size

Es(V)

Expected spill cost to society per voyage (or
per month of offshore drilling)
Expected spill cost to the private firm per

Ef(V)

voyage (or per month of offshore drilling)
k

Value of oil, per unit volume

D(S)

Cost of pollution damage

7r

Probability of detection of spill

H(T)

Expenditure of surveillance

F

Value of penalty fines

f

Value of penalty fine assessed per unit volume
of spillage

particular voyages or offshore locations is a function of the size of
the spill; I later consider the problem of measuring this damage.
I first specify the expected total cost of oil spillage to society for a
particular event:
Es(V) = P [kS+D(S)i-C(P,S)+H(i)] + [l-P] [C(P,S) + H(ir)]
= PkS + PD(S) + C(P,S) + H(r)
(1)
Necessary conditions for the optimal level of spill-prevention
investment are obtained by partially differentiating eq. (1) with
respect to P and S and are:
-Cp = D + kS
(2a)
-CS = P (k+D')

(2b)

Investment which reduces the probability of accident should be
made until its incremental cost just equals the incremental reduction
in accident probability times the cost of an accident. Investment
which helps contain the oil in the event of an accident should be
made until its incremental cost equals the incremental reduction in
spill size times the probability of accident.
I assume that the firm which spills oil and is detected is subject to
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a penalty charge. Consequently, for a firm the expected total cost of
an oil spill is:
Ef(V)

=

Pi[kS+F+C(P,S)] + Pll-i] [kS+C(P,S)] + [l-P] [C(P,S)]

(3)
= PkS + PrF + C(P,S)
Its optimal level of spill-prevention investment is committed when
the following conditions are satisfied:
-Cp = 7rF + kS

(4a)

-CS = P(k+"F')

(4b)

Comparison of eqs. (4a) and (4b) with eqs. (2a) and (2b) reveals
that, when detection is a certainty (r = 1), the penalty charge or fine
must vary with the amount of spillage and be equal to the cost of
damage caused if it is to induce socially optimal behavior from the
firm. These conditions correspond to the conventional prescription
that the fine be set equal to marginal social cost. Note, however, that
in this case two margins are being dealt with, the reduction of spill
probability and the reduction of spill size, given that an accident has
occurred. The efficient solution requires, for the first, knowledge of
the total damage cost and, for the second, knowledge of the rate of
change of damage with spill size.
When detection is not certain (ir< 1), firms will not be induced to
commit the socially desirable amount of pollution-reducing investment unless penalties are levied which exceed the value of the damage done in a particular instance. This poses a curious dilemma. On
the one hand, "making the punishment fit the crime" dictates that
an individual offender not be subjected to penalties greater than the
social damage he has caused, but, on the other hand, failure to have
an upward bias in fines will result in a nonoptimal level of spillpreventing investment. In view of the difficulty of evaluating the
total damage attributable to oil spills, D(S), this dilemma turns out
to be of abstract, rather than practical, interest.
If for the moment it is accepted that a target value for environmental quality has been established-reflecting insofar as possible the
balances between extra investment and losses attributable to spills, as
specified in eqs. (2a) and (2b)-it is possible to identify the options
open to an agency charged with achieving this target. The agency's
"control variables" are the charges it is empowered to levy and the
amount of effort (expenditure) it devotes to detecting spills by
tankers or offshore drillers. The consequences of choosing different
levels of penalty charges and of enforcement expenditures are illustrated in Figure 37 If it is assumed that fines are levied in proportion
7. Figure 3 refers to the frequency of occurrence of spills, ignoring methods for reducing
expected spill size if one occurs.
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to the quantity of oil spilled-that is, F = fS or F' = f, where f is a
constant-then eqs. (4a) and (4b) become:
Cp = (irf + k) S
-CS = (7rf +k) P

(5a)

(5b)
Deterrence can be increased by greater expenditure on enforcement,
which raises 7r, or by a higher per-barrel fine, f.
Since enforcement activity represents a social cost and fines collected do not, one might be inclined to favor very high fines and very
low expenditures on enforcement. 8 However, it is possible that
notions of fairness will intervene. If fines are limited to fixed rates
not in excess of what can be rationalized as the value of social
damage, selection of the level of expenditure on surveillance and
enforcement becomes an interesting problem. For the structure of
fines envisaged in Figure 3 and for a given unit charge (f, , for
example) there exists an optimal level of enforcement expenditure,
H*. 9

In meeting its responsibility for seeing that target levels of environmental quality are maintained, the control agency relies on its power
to enforce penalty charges in instances of oil spillage. Hence it does
not involve itself directly with industry operating decisions. Alternative methods of preventing spills are better known to companies in
the industry. Interpreting Figure 3 to represent the transport of oil
by a particular route, as the control agency increases penalties and
toughens enforcement in order to reduce accident frequency the
industry is led to invest in successively more costly equipment, according to the curve -Cp . At some point, indicated by the line L, it
will be cheaper for the industry to abandon the route in favor of an
alternative one.' ' The agency is not required to participate in these
specific decisions.
CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR CONTROLLING OIL SPILLS

As a result of recent concern over pollution of the seas, a number
of proposals have been brought forward for dealing with the oil-spill
problem. Lawyers have been prominent in this discussion, and the
approaches suggested frequently reflect legal methods for dealing
with a situation in which one party inflicts damage upon another. In
8. I assume throughout that decisions are based on the expected value of future events,
envisaging a highly developed insurance market. If risk aversion is a factor in private decisions, the simple relation between fine level and detection probability contained in eqs. (5a)
and (5b) would be invalid.
9. Analysis of this problem is dealt with by the present author in an unpublished paper.
10. This situation could be illustrated by the proposed tanker shipment of Alaskan crude
oil to several West Coast ports; the alternative is overland pipeline transport to various
mid-continent markets.
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FIGURE 3

Effect of Varying Level of Fines (or Enforcement Expenditures)
on Investment in Accident Prevention
Incremental cost and
expected incremental benefits
of reducing
probability of accident

kS+D

kS + 7r,
f2 S (or kS + 7,f, S)
kS + ilr
f, S

P*

P"

P,

PO

Probability of accident, P
Symbols: -Cp

=

Incremental cost of reducing the probability
of accident ($/probability unity)

kS + D = Expected incremental benefit to society of
reducing the probability of accident
($/probability unit)
kS + ifjS = Expected incremental benefit to firm of
reducing the probability of accident
($/probability unit), given probability of
detection, hi, and fine, fj($fbbl. spilled)
L = Limiting incremental expenditure beyond which
the firm will choose alternative route (or
location)
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this section we will examine three proposals; while these appear to be
representative, they by no means exhaust the field.
A. Specific Regulations-Compensation.
The establishment of standards applying to tanker construction
and of rules governing tanker operation has often been advocated,
and considerable effort has been expended internationally along this
line. Dunn and Hargrave argue:
...regulations concerning oil tankers could be established to limit
the speed of tankers within a certain distance of land, to require a
certain standard of navigational equipment to be carried, and to
require that the masters and crews of such tankers be specifically
qualified to handle these vessels ....

Further, structural specifica-

tions might be set to require, for example, the division of tankers
into more compartments to minimize oil loss when a tanker is

holed. 1 1

Regulations of this sort would force adoption of certain changes
of the type discussed in the previous section, and this could be
expected to systematically lower the probability of accident occurrence and to diminish the seriousness of any accidents which did take
place. Dunn and Hargrave are, of course, correct in their acknowledgment that:
There is no doubt that there would be difficulties in implementing
12
such regulations, as many could not be directly enforced.
Although the problem of enforcement would be formidable, particularly in view of the international aspects, there is another obstacle
to implementation which is perhaps even more serious: no standard
is suggested for deciding which regulations to institute and which to
discard.
Consider the demands placed on an agency charged with controlling marine spills. Once a target level of acceptable spillage risk is
established, the agency must then choose a set of measures to achieve
that result. Discovering least-cost techniques is a traditional function
of industry, and it is doubtful that public agencies can be equipped
to explore various technical alternatives in order to find the most
efficient package. This would be very difficult if only a single set of
regulations were required. It becomes a virtual impossibility if many
sets are needed. Yet various performance targets are likely to be
appropriate for different areas, depending on geographical configura11. Dunn & Hargrave, supra note 2, at 161.
12. Id.
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tion' ' or population density. Furthermore, even for a given performance target, varying combinations of pollution-preventing measures
might be most efficient in different circumstances.
In a system where specific regulations bear the responsibility for
engendering appropriate investment in spill prevention, liability of
the polluter is sought not for the purpose of conveying incentives but
rather to provide compensation for the victims of pollution.' In the
extreme, the cost of damage attributed to spills is treated as a normal
industry expense rather than as an indication to vessel owners and
insurers of the appropriate precautionary expenditures. This view
appears most clearly in proposals that governments levy a uniform
tax on operations to provide funds for accident compensation. Dunn
and Hargrave refer to a per-barrel tax on incoming oil levied by the
state of Maine; a similar measure has been reported out of committee
in the Washington State Legislature.' I These taxes would apply to
vessels with modem, costly, spill-reduction features as well as to old
ships from the pre-ecology era. The implied freedom of the vessel
operator from responsibility for achieving performance goals is seen
in the following remarks:
....

in considering penalties, it is suggested that except in the case

of flagrant violations of regulations, fines and criminal sanctions
should be abolished. The emphasis should be placed on compensation for damage done, rather than the attachment of guilt or penal
sanctions to the polluter.' 6
B. Strict Liability.
An alternative proposal is the establishment of strict, or absolute,
liability, whereby a vessel operator or offshore driller is liable for
damages inflicted on others as a result of his oil spills even though he
has taken "reasonable precautions." Fault does not require proof of
negligence, and it does not imply any kind of moral guilt. For
example, in England and the United States absolute liability has been
applied to owners of steam locomotives where sparks from the stacks
set fire to private property.' ' While strict liability greatly facilitates
13. Rules presently distinguish areas such as the high seas, restricted waters, and open
waters. Restricted waters are defined as ports, channels or canals, and river areas. Open
waters are defined as bays, estuaries, sounds, and the contiguous zone.
14. This seems to be the position of Dunn & Hargrave, supra note 2, at 161. Although
they remark that "... if there is a large contingent liability attached to a spill, prevention
should follow as a matter of self interest on the part of those facing the contingent liability," they later indicate indifference as to whether the funds to compensate the victims are
provided by a per-barrel tax on all shippers or by a scheme of compulsory insurance.
15. Id. at 161;Vancouver Sun, Feb. 10, 1972, at 3.
16. Dunn & Hargrave, supra note 2, at 161.
17. Avins, Absolute Liabilityfor Oil Spillage, 36 Brooklyn L. Rev. 359, 361 (1970).
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the claims of victims for compensation, it also creates incentives for
the liable party to prevent recurrence of the accident. With respect to
oil pollution, it is argued that the necessity of meeting the full cost
of damages will induce polluters to invest to the appropriate degree
in preventative measures.
This point is stressed by H. J. McGurren. The crux of his argument
is summarized by two excerpts:
... for adequate compensation for those injured by oil pollution,
and for the most efficient allocation of resources legislation must be
enacted that will place the full cost of the removal of the oil and the
full costs of any injuries caused by the oil spill on the entity that
creates the risk of an oil spill. To accomplish this the legislation must
provide for unlimited financial1 responsibility and hold the oil
shipper liable regardless of fault. 8
If any lesser liability were to be applied, the insurance premiums
would not reflect the true value of the risk, and therefore, the
industry would not be taking into account all the costs of carrying
on its business and would not be sufficiently induced to eliminate
the risks created by its activities.' 9
Figure 4 reproduces a diagram by McGurren in which he posits a
damage function ("incremental net fishing damage avoided," curve
YX') and a curve showing the cost of prevention ("marginal cost of
optimal combination of preventative methods," curve AB). The
figure demonstrates that minimum social cost (damage plus prevention) is achieved at the level of prevention T, where incremental net
fishing damage avoided is equal to the marginal cost of the optimal
combination of preventative methods. Only if the vessel operator
bears both types of cost (that is, if the costs of fishing damage are
internalized to his operation) will the "efficient" level of oil spills
take place.
This is a familiar economic logic, although it is sometimes held to
be inadequate because of the implied assumptions about pricing in
related sectors. However, putting this objection aside, my primary
concern is whether in practice reliance should be placed on an
absolute liability system. For this type of system to function as
envisaged by McGurren, the damage function must be determined. It
is important, therefore, to consider whether courts can be expected
to establish the correct value of damages. Failing assurance on this,
could the system, though imperfect, work tolerably well compared
to alternatives?
18. McGurren, The Externalitiesof a Torrey Canyon Situation; An Impetus for Change
in Legislation, 11 Natural Resources J., 349, 372 (1971).

19. Id. at 369.
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FIGURE 4
Pollution Prevention Under
Perfect Enforcement of Strict Liability*
Incremental net
fishing damage
avoided
Cost and
damages

Units of pollution prevented
by combination of varied
methods
*Source: McGurren, The Externalities of a Torrey Canyon Situation; an Impetus for
Change in Legislation, 11 Natural Resources J. 349, 361 (1971).

The assessment of damages in a consistent fashion is a severe problem for courts under the best circumstances. In the case of marine
pollution especially formidable problems arise. Oil spilled into the
oceans bears a cost to society not only through observed kills of
wildlife, but also because of the possibility that gradual accumulation
of large quantities of hydrocarbons may have damaging effects on
the marine food chain.' 0 Current scientific evidence does not afford
a basis for placing a value on this type of damage. When we consider
instances where persons are directly affected, usually as a result of
accidents in open or restricted waters, other problems emerge. Most
20. See, e.g., Blumer, Oil Pollution of the Ocean, in Oil on the Sea 1 (D. Hoult ed. 1969).
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legal experience in assessing damages relates to situations where harm
is done to the person or property of the injured party. Assessing
other types of damage is more difficult, as, for example, when
merchants in a seaside resort town lose expected business because
potential visitors go elsewhere upon hearing the condition of the
beach. More difficult still is the valuation of public goods. In the
Pacific Northwest many people visit and enjoy the islands in Puget
Sound and the Straits of Georgia; if the beaches were spoiled and
their wildlife injured by spillage of Alaskan crude oil, both residents
and visitors would suffer harm. It is difficult to imagine how courts
or any other body could establish a satisfactory basis for awarding
compensation in this situation. One suggestion is to tie the claim for
compensation to the cost of restoring the waters to their original
condition, but such restoration may be impossible at any cost.
The problem of measuring damage attributable to oil spillage-in
other words, revealing the curve YX' to vessel operators-casts severe
doubt upon the strict liability approach. At the very least, to make
such a system work at all, court awards would have to achieve consistency; otherwise operators could not judge acceptable risk levels
when deciding locations for production facilities and transportation
routes or when planning spill-reducing investment. Yet even
achieving consistency, as opposed to striving for absolute accuracy, is
an ambitious goal. Conventions would have to be developed, a form
of specialized activity for which courts would not appear to have any
special competence. The concept of strict liability, enforced through
the courts, is not a panacea for the problem of marine oil pollution.

C. Amenities Rights.
A third way in which the law might be extended in the interest of
environmental quality is by the development of so-called amenities
rights. As advocated by L. F. E. Goldie:
The proposal here ...is whether from such procedural starting
points as those offered in the present Michigan statute, or merely by
developing a strictly common law substantive right, courts and
legislatures have an opportunity of developing amenities rights
directly ascribable to individuals.
Of what should an individual's amenities rights consist? They
would appear to be emerging as an enforceable claim for the protection of a right to health, by preventing the pollution of the air by
chemicals and by noise, and a right to vindicate the individual's stake
in the community's heritage of a beautiful landscape. There also
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appears to be a right of recreation in quiet places or in areas of

dramatic and unspoilt grandeur ....

21

Professor Goldie favors reliance on amenities rights over use of
pollution taxes for dealing with the externalities, or spillover effects,
of manufacturing operations because such rights afford a direct and
decentralized procedure for attaining redress. In his words:
Amenities rights as a branch of private law could give the party
harmed the right to pursue his remedy, rather than depend on the

discretion of a bureaucrat. In addition, the courts' jurisdiction to
award compensation should be combined with an authority to issue
orders forbidding, or conditionally limiting, polluting activities, so
that spillovers causing disamenities could be reduced to a level where
they would have to become tolerable to the individuals
and com22
munities whom they discommoded in the first place.
As a case in point, he suggests that had amenities rights been
developed at the time, citizens of Santa Barbara would have been
able to enjoin drilling off their coast, and the notorious spills would
never have occurred.2 3
The appeal of establishing a legal basis for private actions in defense of environmental quality is considerable. One indispensable
role of such actions is to provide a response to changing circumstances. Effective regulatory systems cannot be set up until a degree
of familiarity is gained, and it therefore is essential to have legal
means for enjoining new industrial activity which might have serious
side effects. This is recognized in the procedures instituted under the
United States Environmental Protection Act. Furthermore, to
forestall objections from manufacturers, Professor Goldie envisages
2
the development of a "rule of reason." The Michigan statute 4
which he describes provides the basis, since the defendant can plead
...that there is no feasible and prudent alternative to [his] conduct
and that such conduct is consistent with the promotion of the public
health, safety and welfare in light of the state's paramount concern
for the protection of its natural resources from pollution, impairment or destruction. 2 s

My earlier discussion of the economics of the spill problem suggests, however, that while private actions may usefully supplement
systematic regulation, they cannot replace it. With regard to ocean
21. Goldie, Amenities Rights-Parallelsto Pollution Taxes, 11 Natural Resources J, 274,

275 (1971).
22. Id. at 276.
23. Id. at 278.
24. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 691.1203 (supp. 1970) cited in Dunn & Hargrave, supra
note 2, at 278.
25. Goldie, supra note 21, at 278.
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transport of oil and offshore drilling, serious limitations of an amenities rights system are evident. I have previously stressed the economic
argument that decisions with regard to tanker design and use should
be made at the margin, that is, through determination of how much
more investment should be made in order to obtain further increments of hazard reduction. Courts adjudicating individual rights are
not equipped to gather and utilize the economic data required for
making this type of decision. Another objection to reliance on
private suits stems from the public-good aspect of damage resulting
from oil spills. The concept of public goods is at odds with the
concept of individual rights. In making provision for a public good
(in this case, fixing the level of risk of oil spillage), there is likely to
be a minimum (or maximum) level which is socially acceptable. Its
attainment can perhaps be facilitated by the vesting of rights in
particular individuals. It is necessary, however, to go further-to
determine exactly what level is to be provided-and this determination cannot be properly reduced to a question of individual rights.
ELEMENTS OF AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
TO MANAGING THE SPILL PROBLEM
Before considering alternative institutions for controlling marine
oil pollution the salient features of the oil-spill problem need to be
summarized and classified. In examining the economics of the problem I observed that there are many options in design and operating
procedure which can be utilized to reduce the frequency and severity
of spills. These bear a cost, so that an economically efficient solution
requires that the cheaper measures be used first. It also requires that
investment devoted to preventing spillage be balanced against the
damage caused by oil pollution. In my criticism of some of the
control schemes currently being advocated another important point
emerged, the difficulty of placing a value on damage costs because of
the public-good character of marine oil pollution. New procedures
will have to be developed for establishing performance targets with
respect to oil spillage. Neither damages awarded through private suits
nor injunctions maintaining private amenities rights are likely to
reveal the appropriate target levels.
A comparison of situations in which pollution occurs brings out
some further features of the oil-spillage problem. Figure 5 classifies
acts affecting the environment along two significant dimensions: (a)
the columns distinguish between situations where a private individual
(or club) bears the consequences of an act affecting the environment
and those where there is a significant public element, and (b) the
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FIGURE 5
Classification of Acts Affecting the Environment
with respect to
Frequency of Occurrence and Incidence of Effects
Incidence
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Frequency
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I
I
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Continuous
(repetitive events)
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IS

Low Fixity
of Capital

rows distinguish between actions which take place discretely and
those activities which continue repetitively in time. Row B of Figure
5 is subdivided to show a further distinction between activities of
high and low capital fixity. For example, an offshore oil field is
characterized by high fixity. If spill experience in servicing wells and
transferring and shipping crude is unacceptable and cannot be
remedied short of abandoning the field, the investment in the field
will be lost. The situation is different for shipment of crude oil
between a pair of ports. Current practices can be modified if spill
experience is unsatisfactory, but should pollution levels still be un-
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acceptable abandonment of the route need not result in much loss of
investment. Alternate supply sources and markets are likely to be
available. If tankers were being used, they could be diverted to other
routes where spills may have less serious consequences; at worst, they
could be converted for carriage of other bulk cargoes.
In cells IA and IB of Figure 5, one party generates certain environmental spillovers which fall either on an individual or upon an organized group. An example of category IA might be the removal of trees
or the erection of structures adjacent to a property line so that view
or sunlight are affected. If a dry cleaner regularly discharged organic
chemicals into a lake whose other use was to serve a private fishing
club, we would have a IB situation. Whether the environment is
affected by an action which is a discrete event or by continuous
activity which takes place over time, problems classified in the first
column are of the type stressed by Coase,2 6 who described their
resolution through bargaining between the affected parties. Usually
rules governing the bargaining are imposed through the establishment
of rights. The parties in dispute can go to court if the nature of the
rights is in doubt. Where the activity is repetitive, laws which
proscribe specific practices and which are backed by a government
enforcement agency are commonly utilized.
In cells IIA and IIB environmental spillovers have the characteristics of a public good. Two issues of great concern in the Pacific
Northwest at present belong in this category: the plan of Seattle City
Light and Power Company to raise the level of Ross Lake, which
would cause the inundation of the Skagit Valley in British Columbia,
and the proposal of British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority to
dam the Fraser River. The environmental consequences of these
projects would be very significant. In the first instance, a distinctive
wildlife habitat would disappear; in the second, the character of a
major river would be changed. While only a few people may actually
be relocated or have their sources of livelihood impaired, large
numbers of people are involved because of the effects on a shared
environment.
The analytical problems raised by public goods have been extensively studied by economists, but specification of conditions for
optimality that can be applied as policy norms has not been
achieved. It is not surprising, therefore, that it has proved difficult to
establish satisfactory institutions for settling questions involving the
level of environmental quality. I have previously mentioned the
recent statute making the State of Washington party to court pro26. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law and Econ. 1 (1960).
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ceedings involving water quality; presumably the state will give
substance to public interest in resisting degradation of the environment. Professor Goldie's amenities rights, by establishing a strong
presumption that existing levels of environmental quality should not
be impaired, would perhaps serve to make an individual or a small
group an effective spokesman for the public, where the public is
identified with the environmental status quo. An alternative which
offers advantages over either of these plans is the creation of a
specialized tribunal charged with establishing environmental quality
targets. Its membership would include, in addition to lawyers, other
professionals such as accountants, economists, and scientists. Such a
body could judge the extent to which particular projects should be
allowed to alter the environment. The tribunal would be competent
to secure and interpret the type of evidence needed to support or
rebut contentions about the seriousness of environmental effects or
the practicability of alternative processes or sites.
The troublesome public-good aspect of pollution damage is a
feature of situations in the IIB category, but, in contrast with IIA,
the repetition of events through time means that the environmental
quality targets can be periodically reviewed and modified. This possibility makes the goal-setting task assigned to the proposed tribunal
more feasible, and at the same time it strengthens the case for having
this function assigned to a specialized institution for which environmental quality problems are a continuing responsibility. Most pollution problems accompanying marine oil transportation and offshore
production fall into the IIB category. Some examples will show not
only that performance standards can be periodically adjusted, but
also that changed circumstances demand changed standards:
(1) A particular form of pollution may have a cumulative effect.
There is some evidence of this with respect to oil in the oceans,
although the matter is controversial. If evidence is obtained of harmful effects resulting from a buildup of pollutant, then tightened
performance standards are called for, perhaps leading to outright
prohibition of the polluting activity.
(2) Regulation is often instituted to overcome what would otherwise be a common property situation. However, the authority of a
regulatory agency may not extend to all sources of pollution of a
particular type or capable of a particular effect. Some response in
standards for the regulated activity might be called for if the quantity of pollutant from another source changed. If, for example, one is
concerned with the amount of oil going into the oceans, one might
wish to modify standards relating to the transport of oil, when a
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significant change occurred in the quantity of oil from industrial
wastes entering the sea via rivers.
(3) New options may become available which make it cheaper to
meet pollution targets. Indeed, it would be expected that innovations
would be induced by any regime which attached a price to, or
restricted use of, a previously free resource. Some part of the gains
associated with such innovations should be realized in the form of
higher standards of environmental quality.2 7
(4) Over time the demand for environmental quality may change.
For example, as particular areas become more thickly settled or gain
higher levels of income, their environmental concerns may be keener.
Even though higher pollution abatement costs fall on consumers, the
public may prefer movement toward higher environmental quality
not only for immediate gratification but also in order to reduce the
risk of harmful effects not presently perceived or taken into account.
My discussion of institutions for managing marine oil pollution has
envisaged two bodies, a tribunal which is responsible for setting
environmental quality targets and an enforcement agency which is
responsible for seeing that these targets are achieved in an efficient
way. I will conclude with a few brief comments about these two
tasks, noting first that their separation, arising from functional differences, offers an advantage in itself. A common and well-founded
complaint about regulatory agencies is that in the process of regulating an industry they tend to identify with the interests of that
industry. This pro-industry bias conflicts with the public interest. In
the arrangement contemplated here, the enforcement agency operates within well-defined rules, employing specified powers to attain
specified aims. It should not, therefore, be vulnerable to industry
pressures. While enforcement is a day-by-day concern, the tribunal's
part is played only on periodic occasions. This should help to make
the tribunal more visible, affording added reason for optimism about
its ability to maintain an impartial status.
With regard to the enforcement agency, the choice of control
instrument is very important. In type IIB situations the events which
give rise to accidental spills are repetitive and many industrial firms
are involved. It would not be administratively feasible to negotiate
agreements with each firm, so the desired environmental quality
target must be achieved through the implementation of some set of
regulations, subsidies or penalties. I have previously urged the de27. I have previously analyzed such gains from innovation in Canadian Council of Resource Ministers, Producers' Decisions and Water Quality Control, 3 Pollution and Our
Environment (1967). Much of this was reproduced without essential change by Zerbe,
Theoretical Efficiency in Pollution Control, 8 West. Econ. J. 364 (1970).
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sirability of leaving the affected industry wide scope in the choice of
technology and operating procedures. An instrument which permits
this is the imposition of fines or penalty charges when spills occur, as
was demonstrated earlier. For this reason, I favor such a system,
rather than one which relies on specific rules and regulations. Operators of tankers or offshore rigs would be fined whenever a spill
resulted from their activity, with no need for the enforcement
agency to demonstrate negligence. This latter proviso is necessary if
the system is to induce efficient adjustment by the industry to meet
the environmental quality target.
Finally, turning to the proposed tribunal, much emphasis has
already been placed on the difficulty of its task of setting appropriate performance standards. Economic analysis can lead to estimates of the cost of some types of pollution damage, but it cannot
provide all-inclusive formulas. The tribunal must first listen to the
contentions of persons representing various interests. Environmental
groups should be heard; alternatively, their position might be presented by a government agency, invested with standing before the
tribunal and entrusted with examining the implications for the
environment of industrial activity. Industry representatives should
present evidence about the cost of improving performance or of
turning to alternative routes or locations. It would be important,
however, for the tribunal to have independent access to information
to help it evaluate the evidence placed before it. To some extent this
service could be provided by expert witnesses. However, if decisions
about pollution are to be made with increasing confidence, it will be
necessary to systematically assemble data pertaining to the nature
and extent of damage, costs of abatement measures and the economics of alternative methods for meeting industrial goals. To these
must be added information describing performance levels achieved
under regulation as well as the costs of regulation itself. To obtain
this information and to encourage the development of better analytical techniques, the tribunal should be served by an independent
research group.

